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Abstract.  1The success of a few theories in statistical 
thermodynamics can be correlated with their selectivity to reality. 
These are the theories of Boltzmann, Gibbs, end Einstein.  
The starting point is Carnot’s theory, which defines implicitly the 
general selection of reality relevant to thermodynamics. The three 
other theories share this selection, but specify it further in detail. 
Each of them separates a few main aspects within the scope of the 
implicit thermodynamic reality. Their success grounds on that 
selection. Those aspects can be represented by corresponding 
oppositions. These are: macroscopic – microscopic; elements – 
states; relational – non-relational; and observable – theoretical. 
They can be interpreted as axes of independent qualities 
constituting a common qualitative reference frame shared by 
those theories. Each of them can be situated in this reference 
frame occupying a different place. This reference frame can be 
interpreted as an additional selection of reality within Carnot’s 
initial selection describable as macroscopic and both observable 
and theoretical. The deduced reference frame refers implicitly to 
many scientific theories independent of their subject therefore 
defining a general and common space or subspace for scientific 
theories (not for all).  
The immediate conclusion is: The examples of a few statistical 
thermodynamic theories demonstrate that the concept of “reality” 
is changed or generalized, or even exemplified (i.e. “de-
generalized”) from a theory to another.  
Still a few more general suggestions referring the scientific 
realism debate can be added: One can admit that reality in 
scientific theories is some partially shared common qualitative 
space or subspace describable by relevant oppositions and rather 
independent of their subject quite different in general. Many or 
maybe all theories can be situated in that space of reality, which 
should develop adding new dimensions in it for still newer and 
newer theories. Its division of independent subspaces can 
represent the many-realities conception. The subject of a theory 
determines some relevant subspace of reality. This represents a 
selection within reality, relevant to the theory in question. The 
success of that theory correlates essentially with the selection 
within reality, relevant to its subject.  
 
   
1 INTRODUCTION 
A formal setting of how a scientific theory selects reality can be 
the following: Let N “things” share some M-dimensional space of 
their states so that N < M.  Then 𝑀𝑀 −𝑁𝑁 dimensions and thus a 
corresponding (𝑀𝑀 −𝑁𝑁)-dimensional subspace of the initial M-
dimensional space, in which all those “things” can be situated, are 
necessarily common. That subspace can be interpreted as the 
selection of reality relevant to the things in question and possibly 
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studied by some scientific discipline and described by relevant 
and competitive theories. 
The “things” can be interpreted as the elements of a set. The 
space of states is describable as a well-ordered set of 
“dimensions” (interpretable as qualities or quantities of the 
things). Any dimension has to have at least two discernibly 
distinguishable state being a quality and furthermore some one-
to-one mapping into a number set being quantity rather than 
quality. The mathematical concept of vector space is an example 
of that kind of space.  
In other words, the selection of reality relevant to some 
scientific theory or theories is seen as sharing a few common and 
inherent qualities or quantities of the things studied. Thus the 
selected reality corresponds to the extension of the theory, i.e. all 
common properties and relations shared by all studied things and 
preferably only by them. 
Furthermore, reality can be thought as dividing the space of 
states into two parts or subspaces: constant and variable.  
Husserl’s phenomenology and especially “eidetic reduction” 
was what paid attention to that constant and invariant part of 
reality “bracketing” the other, variable part. However the analogy 
to Husserl’s phenomenology should stop here for his 
“phenomenon” as the corresponding constant and invariant part 
of intention, still more both “phenomenological and 
transcendental reduction(s)”, are not yet relevant to our discussion 
remaining in the scope of realism.    
One can think of reality selected by some scientific theory also 
as a partial, but working concept of reality addressed just to that 
theory. If that is granted, its intension is the constant and invariant 
part of the space of states described by the theory, and its 
extension is the other, the variable part. Then the general sense of 
the concept of reality valid for any partial reality of any scientific 
theory is just that dividing the space of states into two disjunctive 
and exhausting subspaces corresponding to those constant and 
variable parts. 
In other words, selecting relevant reality means the choice of a 
relevant boundary between the variable and constant, and thus 
between extension and intension to be defined rather implicitly by 
the context of the theory as a whole. 
In fact, the practicality of selecting reality is only relative, in 
relation to another, parent or competitive, and thus 
commeasurable theory.  That implies a comparison will select a 
few or even only one dimension(s), which change their (its) 
modus: from the constant part (intension of the partial reality) to 
the variable one (extension) or vice versa. 
The core of that approach is to be substituted the general and 
in fact metaphysical problem about reality at all by the practically 
useful and in fact methodological issue about the change of the 
concept of partial reality between two (or more) very close and 
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thereupon commeasurable theories. Consequently, selective 
realism is interpreted in thus in a fundamentally relative rather 
than absolute way: What are selected are only a few dimensions 
of the space of states changed its modus: either from intentional 
to extensional or vice versa. 
That kind of selective realism is used as a methodology to be 
compared the implicit concept of partial reality in three successive 
theories in statistic thermodynamics: those of Boltzmann, Gibbs, 
and Einstein. All of them, being some additional specifications of 
thermodynamics, are naturally situated in the reference frame of 
Carnot’s theory.  
 The implicit concept of the corresponding partial reality has 
been changed is changed as follows: 
0. (Carnot) Classical thermodynamics describes laws in terms 
of quantities of that reality, which is as macroscopic as empirically 
and experimentally observable. 
1. (Boltzmann) The mechanical motions of the huge number of 
microscopic elements of a statistical ensemble result into the 
thermodynamic quantities of any macroscopic physical object 
averagely. The empirically and experimentally observable 
quantities are deduced as derivative from a hidden theoretical 
reality of microscopic elements such as atoms and molecules. 
2. (Gibbs) The mechanical motions of the huge number of 
microscopic elements are substituted by different possible states 
of a macroscopic physical object equivalently and 
mathematically. The empirically and experimentally observable 
thermodynamic quantities are deduced as derivative from a 
hidden theoretical reality of different possible macroscopic states 
of the physical object as a whole.  
3. (Einstein) The mechanically and experimentally observable 
thermodynamic quantities are some function of the Gibbs 
ensemble of all possible states (and thus some relation to it). They 
can be furthermore also referred to the Boltzmann ensemble of 
microscopic elements. Reality includes both the observable object 
and the hidden theoretical model as whether a Gibbs or a 
Boltzmann ensemble as well as the function or relation between 
the object and that model. 
The following conclusion can be deduced: Reality in those 
reference frames can be identified in the following oppositions: 
macroscopic – microscopic; elements – states; relational – non-
relational; observable – theoretical: 
0. (Carnot): Macroscopic, both observable and theoretical. 
1. (Boltzmann): Microscopic, elements, non-relational, 
theoretical. 
2. (Gibbs): Macroscopic, states, non-relational, theoretical. 
3. (Einstein): Both macroscopic and microscopic, both 
elements and states, relational, both observable and theoretical. 
One can admit that still one synthesis has happen later to that 
reality, which can be utilized in a statistical and thermodynamic 
theory: both relational and non-relational. All other syntheses, 
which are implicit in the development of the concept of statistic 
and thermodynamic reality before it, are already completed in the 
Einstein theory.    
One hypothesis might be that quantum statistical 
thermodynamics is what accomplished that last synthesis along 
that it involves still one dimension of another opposition as to 
reality: continuous (smooth) – discrete (quantum). All four 
theories mentioned above mean the thermodynamic and 
mechanical quantities implicitly only as continuous (smooth) 
though some of them introduce discrete elements. 
One can summarizes the case study comparing the three 
theories in thus: The concept of “reality” is changed or 
generalized, or even exemplified (i.e. “de-generalized”) from a 
theory to another. The change can be described as the explicit 
introduction of some new opposition as a still one and new 
dimension of relevant reality, and the generalization as a synthesis 
to some already involved opposition so that the theory is invariant 
to the relevant dimension of reality. The exemplification can also 
be observed being a condition for introducing a few new 
dimensions of reality. Thus, that exemplification simplifies reality 
in a dimension (“a step back”) complicating it in a few others 
(“two steps forward”).     
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 situates the 
utilized version of selective realism and specifies it as a 
methodology for the case at issue. Section 3 selects those 
dimensions of the partial reality in Carnot’s theory, which will be 
modified by the three following theories. Sections 4, 5, and 6 try 
to define explicitly the implicit change of partial reality 
correspondingly in Boltzmann’s, Gibbs’s, and Einstein’s theory. 
Section 7 discusses and tests the hypothesis that quantum 
statistical thermodynamics synthesizes the opposition “relational 
– non relational”. Section 8 unites the changes of partial reality in 
each theory into a single viewpoint, presents the conclusions and 
provides directions for future work.  
2 DIFFERENTIAL REALISM IN THE 
REFERENCE FRAME OF SELECTIVE 
REALISM  
The term of selective realism is rather uncertain. For example, it 
is also utilized in theory of literature and art, meaning that some 
elements of the work are realistically represented unlike others in 
order to be achieved certain artistic suggestion. Their selection is 
a conscious and creative act of the author. 
Its utilization even only in the framework of philosophy of 
science remains too wide, though. One can speak rather of family 
resemblance in its uses emphasizing common marks such as: 
 Scientific realism is the generic term. 
 One or more scientific domains, theories, parts of theories, 
and even only statements are or can be selected according 
some criteria as more or less realistic unlike others of the 
same kind: “Defenders of this form of realism typically 
separate theories into components or aspects according to 
some criterion such as structure or core descriptions or what 
have you and argue that only the selected components are 
eligible for realist claims, while components not thus 
selected (so-called ‘idle’ components) may be ‘false’ or 
‘non-referring’, or simply ‘idle’ for whatever reason, 
without any serious implications for realism” [1]. 
 Being “realistic” most often means to be represented rather 
successfully by certain relevant models in the item(s) at 
issue.   
 The term is a synonym of partial or limited realism. It 
emphasizes the realistic items in the background of the rest 
and can imply certain relations between them. 
 Its intention is to weaken the concept of scientific realism in 
accordance with the real history of science. 
 Key phrases for it might be: scientific realism, selection, 
criteria for selection, and relations of the selected and 
unselected. 
“Selective realism comes in many variants: structural realism”, 
“semi-realism”, “divide-et-impera”, “eclectic realism” [2]. 
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Examples of heterogeneous uses in philosophy of science can 
illustrate the range of its possible implicit meaning: 
Referring to the use of the same term of another author is often 
[3], [5], [6], [7], etc.  
A “selection of scientific disciplines” relevant to scientific 
realism unlike others such as economics also can be meant: 
“scientific realism becomes the philosophy of the privileged class 
of successful (physical) sciences” [4].  
One can discuss “the well-known causal properties of some 
entity” as independent of their interpretation and thus selectable 
realistically or not [5]. The selection of consistent objects in the 
background of inconsistent ones including in the context of 
mathematical realism is criticized as “dangerous” and “unstable” 
[6].  
The term of “selective anti-realism” is also coined [7]. The 
“piecemeal realism” [8] is considered as a synonym of “selective 
realism” [7], and qualified namely as “selective anti-realism” 
emphasizing the non-realistic background of the selected as 
realistic. 
 P. Humphreys [9] offers “a form of selective realism”, “which 
denies that one can simply read the ontological commitments from 
the theory itself”. Its user is who interprets it realistically, but 
utilizes always only a part of it. The use itself of the theory selects 
used and idle parts: “only idle parts of past theories have been 
rejected, while truly success-generating features have been 
confirmed by further inquiry” [10]    
“Selective realism seems to make good sense as a ‘working 
hypothesis’, but as no more than that.” [11] The theories are 
successful in some sense. Their success can be causally explained 
reconstructing selectively those elements caused it. “So-called 
‘selective’ realists attempt to explain various successes in the 
history of science by reconstructing the relevant derivations so as 
to show that the success of a given theory depends only on those 
things it actually got right (be those things properties, structure, or 
whatever).” [11] “Success is supposed to provide a reason for 
believing that particular aspects of a theory are at least 
approximately true. Selective realism thus requires not just 
continuity, but a particular type of continuity: the retention of 
those parts that are differentially supported by the successes of our 
theories.” [12] Success should be investigated comparatively. 
“Perhaps if we understand scientific success as a comparative 
achievement, we will find that success tracks the stable elements 
of our evolving theories more reliably than if we interpret success 
non-comparatively.” [13] 
“Selective realists think that there is not a distinct universal for 
every predicate. How then do they choose which predicates have 
distinct universals?” [14] That criticism discusses selective 
realism in logical, onto-logical and linguistic terms doubting the 
justifiability of the criteria of selection.  “Whereas an unselective 
realist is committed, roughly, to there being a universal for every 
predicate, a selective realist is committed to there being one for 
some but not all predicates.” [15] 
Selective realism correlates with “retail realism” and “retail 
treatment of theoretical entities” [16] In short, then, wholesale 
treatments lead to either wholesale acceptance or wholesale 
rejection of a theoretical entity as it appears in a number of distinct 
theories, while retail treatments allow for the possibility of 
proceeding on a case-by-case basis, which can lead to a kind of 
selective realism about some theoretical entities, but not others.” 
[16]  
One of the most attackable elements of any version of selective 
realism is the criteria for selection. D. Peters argues that “the 
essential posits of a theory are those that unify the accurate 
empirical claims of that theory” [17] There is “the basic rejection 
by selective realism of the view that theories should be treated as 
holistic units for the purpose of realist commitment” [17]. Is the 
selection of parts of any scientific entity at all admissible? 
Some authors discuss aspects of selective realism under other 
names [18], [19] or implicitly, in the context of other discussion 
[20]. 
An article [21] discusses especially selective realism in physics 
and its philosophy: “selective realism rests on a causal test whose 
application is itself part of the scientific enterprise” [21]. However 
the success of a scientific theory goes out of the “scientific 
enterprise” being a rather social and psychological phenomenon. 
“Selective realism is realistic realism, that is realism more true to 
scientific life than any blanket, undiscriminating doctrine.” [21] 
Whether scientific life is more selective and discriminating e.g. 
than life in economy or in politics? “One main aim of any selective 
realism must be to find a principled way of distinguishing, among 
items figuring in scientific theories, those which must, and those 
which need not, or even must not, be given a realistic 
interpretation. This search for a criterion for the real must be 
understood as a search for a criterion for us to count something as 
real ...” [21] In fact being real is always a relation between models 
only normatively independent of each other, e.g. an interpretation 
of experimental data and a forecast of a theory.  
One can reflect on the above bricolage of uses of “selective 
realism”. First, it is a selection of sources accessible as to me. 
Secondly, it is still one following selection of uses most relevant 
to mine. Thirdly, it can be considered as a proto-concept or germ 
of theory about selective realism.  
This hints that any realism is selective, but does reflect on its 
hidden selection far not always. Indeed all authors of scientific 
papers, some of which will be legitimated as theories, select what 
is the most important among the accessible and might guide to the 
cherished success of legitimation observing and comparatively 
estimating the competitors.  
Furthermore, all above uses though selected are only on the 
road to a single concept or theory. They share only some family 
resemblance. Achieving the endpoint of a single and consistent 
theoretical entity is quite not the most optimal strategy for success.  
The author should select the best point for the “camp” of the 
intended paper on that road from the absolute uncertainty to the 
absolute certainty: the more uncertain, the more universal, 
flexible, and adaptable; the more certain, the more stable, 
forecasting, and  efficacious.  
The normatively welcome consistency meets the inconsistent 
circumstances of the real science. The latter is even more 
important for the paper to survive. It should sneak out safe and 
sound among both dense and inconsistent networks of reviewers, 
funding institutions, scientific authorities, influences, 
“paradigms”, impact factors, criticisms, etc.  
Consequently, any reasonable authors select some optimal 
uncertainty for the representation of the results over the 
unintended inconsistency due to their foolishness.  
However and post factum, philosophy and history of science 
are interested in the consistent and “approximately true” parts of 
the theories, i.e. of the most successful papers, selecting only them 
as relevant to realism. One can suggest the hypothesis that the 
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only consistent and thus realistic part of a paper might never sneak 
out standalone through the real science, though: 
 Selective realism selecting only consistent and approximately 
true parts is not realistic. Any paper achieves success as a whole 
and even as a member of the team of similar papers of the same 
and other authors, and the alleged inconsistent or idle parts or 
papers could be exceptionally useful, working and adequate to 
certain real circumstances. 
However and post factum, the philosophers and historians of 
science might hardly reconstruct those real circumstances, to 
which some inconsistent and idle parts or papers could be too 
adequate and thus promoting the whole. Anyway what can the 
realists do really without transforming into social constructivists 
or agnostics? 
The approach in this paper is the following: Relative and 
temporally close theories or hypotheses to be investigated 
comparatively hoping that they had shared common though 
unknown real circumstances. If one takes their difference or 
change from each other, those unknown real circumstances might 
cancel mutually. This implies that the only, which makes sense to 
be selected, is the difference and change of maximal relative and 
temporally close theories and hypotheses.  
One can coin correspondingly the term “differential realism” 
as to that version of selective realism. 
Furthermore, the entire team (consisting whether of scientists 
or of different papers of one and the same author(s), or of parts of 
any scientific entity) seeker for scientific success is better to 
participate in the competition with a “combination” including 
both a constant core and a variable belt of hypotheses. Though 
only a few and even only one member(s) of the combination can 
win, the team cannot know preliminarily which exactly, and the 
combination increases the probability of luck.      
However, the reconstructing selective realist would be to 
qualify the luckless members of the combination as inconsistent 
or idle and thus as useless, which is obviously incorrect.  
What should a differential realist do in that case? 
Any scientific theory or hypothesis can be thought as a single 
notion defined in a rather extended way, and the definition of 
which is merely very, very long. Of course, its length increases 
the probability of being inconsistent. Let us admit that its 
definition is nevertheless consistent for even being inconsistent, it 
can be divided into disjunctive consistent parts and each of them 
can be considered separately.   
Then any notion can be interpreted as a certain relation of its 
extension and intension. The definition represents its intension 
and should unambiguously determine its extension. Furthermore, 
the intension and extension can be united into a common space as 
its disjunctive subspaces. The components for the intension are 
constants, each for each dimension of the corresponding subspace, 
and the components for the extension are variables, each for each 
dimension of the corresponding subspace. Thus the different 
members of the combination will differ from each other by a few 
dimensions passed from the extension to the intension subspace 
or vice versa.  
The differential realist should discuss those a few problematic 
dimensions unlike the reconstructing selective realist paying 
attention only to the member winner. In fact, the attitude of the 
differential realist is much closer to that of the real scientist(s) 
creating the combination seeker for scientific success. 
Furthermore, wrong principles and hypotheses can influence 
the development of science much more than correct theories. For 
example, Einstein’s “Mach’s principle” in general relativity or 
alleged incompleteness of quantum mechanics (EPR) seem to be 
both wrong and exceptionally fruitful, stimulating research 
generated new scientific ideas and areas: the cosmological 
constant, the hidden “dark energy” and “dark matter”, and 
entanglement studied by the theory of quantum information 
nowadays. However as being wrong, they cannot seek for 
scientific success, according to the reconstructing selective realist. 
On the contrary, this is not any problem for the differential 
realist. The explanation of the indirect success of such wrong 
hypotheses is quite natural and simple: They pay attention to a few 
most essential dimensions of reality though they have not 
managed to target the lucky combination. Others will manage … 
Scientific realism is in interested in reality at all, selective 
realism in the selected part of reality, differential realism in the 
small changes of the implicit concept of reality from a theory or 
hypothesis to another very close and relative.                  
3 THE  PARTIAL REALITY OF CARNOT’S 
THEORY AS A REFERENCE FRAME OF 
CHANGE 
Carnot’s theory of heat should be investigated comparatively 
in relation to its predecessors or contemporaries: the theories or 
hypotheses of B. Thompson (Count Rumford), Davy, T. Young, 
J. Herapath, A. Lavoisier, S.-D. Poisson, J. B. J. Fourier, etc.: 
“The dominating theory of the time was the caloric theory. 
Whereas in England caloric theory met its opposition by the 
semimechanical theories of Davy, Young, and Herapath, exerting 
their authority by invoking Newton, in France there was an almost 
complete acceptance of caloric theory, based on the authoritative 
personalities of the likes of Lavoisier, Poisson, and Fourier.” [22] 
R. Fox drew attention to “Watt’s expansive principle in the Work 
of Sadi Carnot and Nicolas Clement” (together with Charles 
Bernard Desormes) [23]. 
However, those theories in turn should be discussed in the 
reference frames of their predecessors, and so on to a kind of “bad 
infinity”. This imposes the beginning to be defined axiomatically, 
i.e. by a few most important properties or relations granted for 
postulates.  
One can criticize that approach as teleological and constituting 
a vicious circle: the axiomatic properties or relations are selected, 
meaning its application to the theories of Boltzmann, Gibbs, and 
Einstein, the implicit concepts of reality in which are to be 
deduced by those axioms. The objection cannot be accepted for it 
is valid to any application of deductive and axiomatic method, one 
of the “three whales” of mathematics.    
The selected postulates about the implicit concept of reality in 
Carnot’s theory are the following: 
1. Reality is both empirically (and experimentally) observable 
and theoretically describable by quantitative models. 
2. Reality is given immediately in macroscopic phenomena. 
In fact, both postulates had been shared by all physical theories 
from the age of Galileo and Newton. So, they do not need any 
express ground. Boltzmann was who revolutionized that implicit 
concept of reality paying the worth of his tragic death.  
The core of Carnot’s work and contribution is the cycle called 
it his honor, the concept of heat (both “le calorique” and “la 
chaleur”), the unity of mechanical work and heat, the postulated 
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impossibility of perpetuum mobile, the first2 and second laws3 of 
thermodynamics, etc.  
However any “translation” (as above) of his work [24] into 
terms and notions of the contemporary “phenomenological 
thermodynamics” is too dangerous and should serve only for a 
preliminary orientation.  
A relatively successful attempt of that kind concludes: 
“CARNOT laws: I. Perpetuum mobile is impossible; II. Heat is 
conserved”. “Thermodynamic laws: I. Energy principle 
[conservation]; II. Perpetuum mobile of second kind is 
impossible”. And then: “While irreversible processes in 
thermodynamics are described by the second law, they are in 
CARNOT'S theory described by the first law. It follows especially 
that the two theories are equivalent as long as only reversible 
processes are considered ...” [25]  
G. Sarton [26] drew attention to an unpublished manuscripts of 
Carnot lucidly revealing that Carnot had anticipated not only 
energy conservation (the first law of thermodynamics), but also 
the main idea of the Boltzmann statistic thermodynamics: 
La chaleur n'est autre chose que la puissance motrice, ou 
plutot que le mouvement qui a change de forme. C'est un 
mouve- ment dans les particules des corps. Partout oiu il y a 
destruction de puissance motrice, il y a, en meme temps, 
production de chaleur en quantite precisement proportionnelle 
'a la quantite de puissance motrice detruite. Reciproquement, 
partout oiu il y a destruction de chaleur, il y a production de 
puissance motrice. 
M. Barnet tried to explain Carnot’s fundamental innovating as 
to the nowadays Second Law of thermodynamics by the auxiliary 
notions of available and unavailable type of energy [27]: The 
former was referred to the parts of a system, and the latter to the 
system as whole. For example, kinetic mechanical energy should 
be of the former type, and potential one of the second. Energy 
conservation and the First Law postulate their equivalence and 
reversibility. On the contrary, the Second law states their 
irreversibility: "available" forms of energy are capable of 
complete transformation into those of the "unavailable" type, the 
extent of transformation of the latter into the former can never, 
even under ideal (reversible) conditions, exceed a definite 
maximum which must always fall short of complete 
convertibility” [27] 
Thus the Second Law would contradict to the First Law if the 
available and unavailable types of energy are not divided into two 
disjunctive physical quantities such as energy (or work, or heat, 
or “la chaleur”) and entropy (or “le calorique”) therefore 
implying the quantity of their relation (or ratio): temperature. 
“Sadi Carnot had, however, formulated the basic ideas relevant to 
the second law of thermodynamics at a time when the caloric 
theory of heat was reigning supreme” [28]        
Another attempt for that translation of Carnot’s theory into the 
language of thermodynamics finds “correspondence between 
entropy and caloric [calorique]” that “may serve as a very 
effective heuristic tool for finding the properties of caloric by 
                                                 
2 “However, SADI CARNOT (1796-1832) was not simply the discoverer 
of the second law; he had also anticipated with astounding directness and 
lucidity the discovery of the first law.” [26] 
3 “We have identified in Carnot’s essay a principle that, with conservation 
of caloric, played the role of the second law of thermodynamics. This 
principle states that the simplest possible cyclic heat engine is one that 
exploitation the results known hitherto from classical 
thermodynamics” [29]. The physical quantity of caloric 
[calorique] should represent the mechanical work per degree fall 
in a Carnot cycle, according to H. L. Callendar [30], and thus the 
physical dimension of caloric would be that entropy, too: 
“Carnot’s cycle thus represents the conversion of thermal 
energy (TS) into mechanical work A by the fall of entropy through 
a potential difference (𝑇𝑇2 − 𝑇𝑇1)  
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 =  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑇𝑇2 − 𝑇𝑇1)” [31] 
J.N. Brønsted  [31] shared the same interpretation of caloric as 
entropy and developed a common theory about the reversible 
cycles of extensive quantities4 such as entropy, mass, electric 
charge through the conjugate potential difference are necessary 
for the production of work. Thus Carnot’s cycle was rather 
generalized from “caloric” to all extensive physical quantities. 
 One of the main problems of that interpretation is how 
“perpetuum mobile” in his work should be interpreted in relation 
of the contemporary distinction between that of first and second 
kind; another: what should be relation between the two terms of 
“le calorique” and “la chaleur”, and the only contemporary term 
of “heat” (or “heat energy”). In particular, this demonstrates that 
the unambiguous, one-to-one translation is impossible. 
Fortunately, one can obtain that unambiguousness considering 
“heat” and “perpetuum mobile” only as the differential 
dimensions of reality in the difference or change between the two 
theories: The “heat” dimension is in the intension of the 
contemporary phenomenological thermodynamics, but in the 
extension of Carnot’s theory having vales as  “le calorique” as “la 
chaleur”.  
On the contrary: the “perpetuum mobile” dimension is in the 
extension of the contemporary phenomenological 
thermodynamics having values as “first kind” as “second kind”, 
but in the intension of Carnot’s theory. 
Thus the comparison between these two theories naturally 
selects the dimensions both of “perpetuum mobile” and of “heat”: 
 If one needs a one-to-one translation for some reason, both 
“first and second kind”, on the one hand, and “le calorique” and 
“la chaleur”, on the other hand, should be reciprocally identified. 
If one needs the differential research of the two theories, the 
relations in this two-dimensional subspace should be investigated 
in detail. That differential research might prove or refused any 
more extended and even complete equivalence of 
phenomenological thermodynamics and Carnot’s theory than the 
common one about reversible processes: 
“A deep symmetry exists between the full system of equation 
of modern thermodynamics and those of the caloric theory – not 
that anybody wrote them down, but the flexibility and the near 
correctness of that theory are manifest.” [35] 
Indeed the relation of heat (chaleur) and caloric (calorique) in 
Carnot’s theory, on the one hand, and that of perpetuum mobile of 
first and second kind in phenomenological thermodynamics, on 
the other hand, can be both interpreted as temperature and then 
entropy conservation per a unit of time to be equivalent to energy 
produces work by extracting heat from one heat reservoir and rejecting 
heat to a cooler heat reservoir.” [33] 
4 The extensive quantities are proportional to the quantity of parts of the 
system, and the intensive ones (such as the corresponding conjugate 
differences of temperature, gravitational or electrical potential) to its 
whole. 
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conservation by the meditation of the Planck constant and 
quantum mechanics [36].  
Even more, Carnot’s theory of heat would turn out to be the 
more general one for it implies a generalization of energy 
conservation to that of calorique, i.e. of entropy (information): 
energy conservation would be equivalent to the linear increasing 
of entropy in time.             
The main problem after reconstructing his work is: “How did 
Carnot know how to close his cycle?” [22] Indeed all great 
contributions to thermodynamics5 and its foundation enumerated 
above are immediate corollaries ones the cycle has been closed. 
The fact of closing the cycle had been obvious to Carnot and 
even to his contemporaries for it is implied by the cycle of steam 
engine, which is obviously closed, and the investigation of which 
is the problem starting point for Carnot:  
In order to consider in the most general way the principle of 
the production of motion by heat, it must be considered 
independently of any mechanism or any particular agent. It is 
necessary to establish principles applicable not only to steam-
engines but to all imaginable heat-engines, whatever the 
working substance and whatever the method by which it is 
operated. [24] 
According to C. Truesdell and S. Bharatha, thermodynamics 
can be based on certain axioms in a way that “the theory of heat 
engines is not an application of general principles but the source 
of them. The traditional "First Law" and "Second Law" of 
thermodynamics, for fluid bodies susceptible only of "reversible" 
processes, appear here as proved corollaries of theorems on heat 
engines...” [37] 
Consequently, the extended “notion” of Carnot’s theory 
represents the consistent theoretical description generalizing the 
work of steam engine. This is the change to predecessors’ and 
contemporaries’ hypotheses about heat.  
However this change is granted and shared by Boltzmann’s, 
Gibbs’s, and Einstein’s theories and thus is irrelevant to their 
differential research here though it would be absolutely relevant 
if the topic was “Carnot’s revolution in (of) thermodynamics (heat 
theory)”. 
These three theories will separate and then will seek for ways 
the observed macroscopic thermodynamic phenomena and the 
hidden theoretical reality to be again united as they were in the 
innocent paradise of Carnot’s theory. This is what determines the 
selection of the above two postulates about the implicit concept of 
reality in Carnot’s theory. 
Nonetheless, the above two postulates about the implicit 
conception of reality in Carnot’s theory imply its achievement: the 
equivalence of the cycle of steam engine and the theoretical 
Carnot cycle and thus the foundation of thermodynamics: 
Indeed the steam engine and its cycle can be relevant to the 
partial reality of Carnot’s theory (according to 2), and they can be 
identified with Carnot’s cycle (according to 1). Then Carnot’s 
cycle should be closed just as its material proto-image, the cycle 
of steam engine really is, and after that and all so important 
corollaries deduced.  
                                                 
5 “It was found that in a number of extremely critical positions, 
thermodynamics is not at all considered an indisputable continuation of 
Carnot's ideas. Moreover, present difficulties in understanding such basic 
However, this implicit concept of reality is not contributed by 
Carnot, but borrowed from the other physical theories then. The 
success of Carnot is its application in a new area therefore 
constituting a new scientific discipline, thermodynamics. 
The reconstructing post factum scientists will wonder “How 
did Carnot know how to close his cycle?” [22]. However their 
problem could be his for his implicit concept of reality could not 
include the posterior separation of the macroscopic 
phenomenological reality from the theoretical one in 
thermodynamics due to the theories of Boltzmann, Gibbs, and 
Einstein, which imply that problem.  
These theories are certainly well-known to the reconstructing 
nowadays. So their reconstruction turns out to be from the future 
of Carnot’s theory and thus only pretending to seek for a causal 
explanation of success.  
This is a fundamental and inherent problem of the 
reconstructing selective realism: How might it prove that its 
reconstruction is not influenced by theories, facts and events 
future to the reconstructed entity. I think hardly...  
4 BOTLZMANN’S THEORY AND ITS 
CHANGE IN THE IMPLICIT CONCEPT OF 
REALITY  
Boltzmann postulated a hidden reality consisting of invisible 
mechanical particles, atoms and molecules, however determining 
our empirical and experimental reality of phenomena in 
thermodynamics: 
The idea of some hidden and determining reality had been quite 
familiar in European philosophy at least since the age of Plato and 
Democritus, and even earlier.  
“Boltzmann's philosophy was realism, or, as at the end he 
occasionally called it, materialism. He derived his conviction of 
the reality of the external world as an object of science from what 
may be called "concordance". The information obtained by 
different senses, with the help of different instruments, by 
different persons, and at different times, always lead to similar 
conclusions about the external, real, world. This could not happen 
if the independent world had no objective existence.” [38] 
“Boltzmann emphasizes that his views are in harmony with those 
who argue for the existence of God” [39] 
Atoms and molecules had been established enough notions in 
chemistry since John Dalton and especially after Mendeleev. They 
were unobservable and thus remained purely theoretical 
constructs, but their supposed reality could explain exceptionally 
simply and entirely the properties of the chemical elements, 
compounds and possible reactions, and even forecast successfully 
new ones thus converting chemistry into an exact science as 
physics.  
However physics had managed to become a deterministic 
science of precise predictions and engineering applications for a 
long time utilizing mathematical model immediately to 
macroscopic phenomena and thus not needing atoms and 
molecules so greatly as chemistry. 
In particular, phenomenological thermodynamics had been 
borrowed and wealthy repeated the general philosophical 
approach to reality of other physical disciplines. Carnot and 
Clausius and many others even before them had already deduced 
thermodynamic parameters as heat energy, heat, work, and, especially, 
entropy are caused to a large degree precisely by Clausius' rejection of 
some of Carnot's fundamental ideas.” [33] 
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mathematical laws and relevant quantities about empirical and 
visible thermodynamic phenomena. 
So, the statistical methods to thermodynamics, which Clausius, 
Maxwell, Helmholtz6, and Boltzmann addressed, seemed to be 
both risky and not enough justified. Nonetheless, these ideas were 
the first steps on the road, which would opposite physics to 
common sense, most obviously in quantum mechanics.  
That certain hidden theoretical reality absolutely different from 
ours, empirical reality and nevertheless grounding it by 
fantastically precise forecasts and technical applications was that 
dangerous philosophical invention, in which Boltzmann would 
situate [40] his new theory.  
The corresponding implicit concept of reality can be placed in 
the reference frame of Carnot’s as follows: 
They are opposed in size: Carnot’s is macroscopic, visible and 
Boltzmann’s is microscopic, invisible even by microscope (in that 
time). Until, then the size is not a dimension of reality: Both big 
and small items shared common reality. 
Consequently, Carnot’s is observable, and Boltzmann’s is not: 
Anyway, the latter is also accessible, but only by theoretical, 
especially mathematical models.  
These models in Boltzmann’s theory are testable and thus 
verifiable by their corollaries producing observable forecasts in 
our usual, empirical reality. “Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie, which 
asserts that scientific theories are ‘mental pictures’ having at best 
a partial similarity to reality, was a core element of his philosophy 
of science.” [41] 
Thus the relation of model and reality abandons the naïve self-
understandable one-to-one mapping between them. EPR’s 
concept “element of reality”, in order to be proved the alleged 
incompleteness of quantum mechanics, would restore the lost 
paradise of that kind of models.  
On the contrary, the models in Carnot’s theory are directly 
testable and verifiable by virtue of that one-to-one mapping.  
Carnot’s reality is holistic as a cycle is a whole. The concept of 
cycle, though borrowed from the empirical cycle of steam engine, 
helped for him to formulated those of caloric and the impossibility 
of perpetuum mobile referable to the whole of a thermodynamic 
system.  
On the contrary, Boltzmann’s reality consists of a simple sum 
of exceptionally many tiny parts: the “atoms” [39]. 
His entropy is restored by the distribution of the “atoms” (they 
can be any many tiny particles, e.g. molecules) in energetic states: 
Entropy (S) is proportional to the logarithm of the number (W) of 
microstates per a macroscopic state (“Boltzmann’s principle”7). 
“The central quantity W is named thermodynamic probability. 
Boltzmann worked out the [above] prescription how to combine 
it with atomistics.” [43]  
                                                 
6 “In a couple of papers [1. Helmholtz, H.: Principien der Statik 
monocyklischer Systeme. Crelle’s J. 97, 111–140 (1884); reprinted 
in:Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen, vol. III, pp. 142–162 and pp. 179–
202, Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig (1895); 2. Helmholtz, H.: Studien 
zur Statik monocyklischer Systeme, Akademie der Wissenschaften zu 
Berlin, S. 159–177 (1884); reprinted in:Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen, 
vol. III, pp. 163–172 and pp. 173–178, Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig 
(1895)] on the mechanical foundations of thermodynamics, Helmholtz 
introduced a class of mechanical systems that was to provide a mechanical 
analogy to the second law of thermodynamics. Helmholtz’s results 
inspired the contemporary Boltzmann paper [3. Boltzmann, L.: U¨ ber die 
Eigenschaften monozyklischer und anderer damit verwandter Systeme. 
“It was this statistical interpretation of a basic law of nature 
which shocked many physicists … “ [39] However, the 
mechanical motion is reversible unlike the irreversibility of the 
second law of thermodynamics and seems to be unreliable as a 
universal ground of entropy increasing though only statistically. 
Boltzmann managed to find a simple, smart and convincing 
explanation [44]:  
Any collision of atoms averages their mechanical quantities 
and thus “flattens” the function of their probability distribution. 
As the number of those collisions increases monotonically in time, 
the probability distribution will flatten and flatten also 
monotonically in time, and entropy will increase and increase 
accordingly. “In other words: any non-uniform distribution 
evolves into an almost uniform one after a long time 𝒕𝒕𝟏𝟏.” [44] 
Indeed the laws of mechanical motion are smooth and thus 
reversible, but not those of collision. Collison is jump-like. Many 
years later, quantum mechanics will manage to prove that the 
uniform description of smooth and quantum (i.e. jump-like) 
motion or change implies irreversibility.  
And vice versa: the combined reversibility and irreversibility 
of the first and second laws of thermodynamics implies for the 
corresponding phase space to be “checked”, the Boltzmann and 
Gibbs entropy not to be equal, thus thermodynamics of the whole 
and that of the parts to be emancipated to each other and therefore 
independent addressing the Einstein statistical thermodynamics 
[45].   
“It should be remarked that earlier (in 1868)8 Boltzmann also 
mentioned Einstein's idea of basing the probabilities W of a 
system in equilibrium on the dynamics of the system, by 
postulating that the probability to find the system in a certain 
region in phase space would be proportional to the time spent by 
the system in that region, which clearly depends on the equations 
of motion. However, he never distinguished this from his 
statistical idea, based on S = k logW of 1877, as Einstein did.” 
[45] 
Boltzmann’s “heat” is the average energy of the statistical 
ensemble. Pressure and volume are deduced also from the average 
mechanical quantities.  
Heat, temperature, pressure, volume are only a macroscopic 
visibility or even “maya”. There is nothing else than moving 
atoms, however still unobservable…: a too dangerous 
combination of radical, hardly acceptable philosophical views and 
missing facts and experiments about the “atoms” as to a scientific 
theory. Thermodynamics is statistical mechanics after Boltzman.  
“It has been suggested that Boltzmann himself, as a result of 
the criticisms of his theory, abandoned his mechanistic philosophy 
and adopted a more pragmatic approach in which the real 
existence of entities like atoms was no longer important. The 
result of this revisionist view is to see Boltzmann as a convert to 
Crelle’s J. 98, 68–94 (1884); reprinted in: Hasen¨ohrl, F. (ed): 
Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen von Ludwig Boltzmann. Band III, p. 
122 (1909); reprinted by Chelsea Publishing NewYork (1968)] in which 
the notions of temperature and pressure were introduced for a one-
dimensional mechanical system with periodic orbits and potential energy 
ϕ(x, V ) depending on a parameter V.” [42] 
7 “This formula was called Boltzmann’s principle by Albert Einstein. It 
is engraved on Boltzmann’s tombstone in the central cemetery of Vienna 
…” [41] 
8 “L Boltzmann, Studien über des Gleichgewicht der lebendigen Kraft 
zwischen bewegten materiellen Punkten, Wien. Ber. 58, 517-560 (1868).” 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3634425
Mach’s philosophy and to make him an honorary member of the 
Vienna Circle. Perhaps the best justification for this interpretation 
is Boltzmann’s view that scientific concepts such as „atom” are 
mental pictures rather than entities independently existing in the 
world.” [46] 
Boltzmann’s reality is not holistic: it is even anti-holistic, 
reductionist. The relation between the whole and the parts is 
directly reduced to properties of the parts. The concept of the 
whole is even redundant, prescientific.  
On the contrary, the idea of cycle in Carnot’s theory 
harmonizes the whole and the parts in a natural, and maybe naïve 
way, so that one cannot ask about their relation. 
Summarizing, the differential investigation of the implicit 
concept of reality in both theories needs the following dimension: 
 Size: microscopic – macroscopic. 
 The relation of the theoretical and empirical (experimental): 
opposition – coincidence 
 The relation of the whole and the parts: harmonized (cyclical) 
– non-relational reductionism (to the “atoms”) 
 The relation of the models to reality: directly testable and 
verifiable – indirectly testable and verifiable (by corollaries). 
In fact, some of marks as to Carnot’s reality could be outlined 
after comparing with Boltzmann’s. They have been available also 
before it, but the juxtaposition activates them by the necessity of 
selection and choice between just these two worlds among the 
many worlds of different theories.   
One can say that the main philosophical problem of 
Boltzmann’s theory is how the whole in phenomenological 
thermodynamics to be entirely represented in terms of a huge set 
of parts, “atoms” [46], thus reduced to them thoroughly and even 
de facto removed.  
“As a physicist working mainly theoretically Boltzmann strove 
for a close relationship to philosophy und recommended such u 
procedure also to his colleagues.” [47] “Mind and matter are not 
separated; they are only different sides or faces of reality. We can 
distinguish but we cannot split them. There are no [purely] mental 
sciences [Geisteswissenschaften]. And it is wrong to think that the 
natural sciences lack direction in terms of mind or spirit.” [48] His 
implicit concept of reality contains the solving of the problem, 
“Boltzmann’s principle”, being supported by European 
philosophy non- and even anti-holistic in comparison to the 
Chinese for example:   
Indeed it guarantees an enough refuge (microscopic and 
invisible, theoretical and only mathematically accessible, 
indirectly testable and verifiable) for the unobservable atoms both 
to exist out of empirical reality and to determine and control it 
nevertheless.                              
5 GIBBS’S THEORY AND ITS CHANGE IN 
THE IMPLICIT CONCEPT OF REALITY 
Gibbs came to the statistical ideas after many years of 
investigation in phenomenological thermodynamics following 
Maxwell’s definition of it expressly “without any hypothesis as to 
the molecular constitution of bodies”, to which paid attention M. 
Klein [49].  
The metaphor that Gibbs’s theory is Boltzmann’s without 
atoms is a relevant starting point to it. Indeed the atoms in 
                                                 
9 The concept of phase space in thermodynamics had been introduced yet 
by Maxwell [49], [50]. Consequently, the philosophizing physicist 
Boltzmann’s theory possessed many redundant properties idle to 
their role in statistical thermodynamics besides being 
undiscoverable. Boltzmann’s principle in fact determines 
altogether their properties really necessary for statistical 
thermodynamics: 
 Their states called microstates are the measure units for the 
empirical observable macroscopic states to be compared to 
each other quantitatively in entropy.  
 Both macro- and microstates share the physical dimension of 
action, the time derivative of which is energy. 
 These two properties absolutely exhaust what statistic 
thermodynamics needs from the concept of atom. So, “phase 
space”9 allows of comparing thermodynamic macroscopic states 
or system getting rid of atoms’ brokering.  
Even much more, that new refined formulation of statistic 
thermodynamics turns out to be rather more general.  
However Gibbs “did not invent the phrase “phase space” [51] 
Moreover, he did not use at all. His fundamental work [52] in 
statistical thermodynamics does contain it no one time. Then is 
not the attribution of “phase space” to his theory absolutely 
nonsense? Quite not, because he used a few other terms even 
stronger than the contemporary use of “phase space”: “extension-
in-phase” (a differential sell in phase space); “density-in-space” 
(the change of the number of systems or states sharing some 
extension(s)-in-phase); “the principle of conservation of 
extension of phase” in two forms: differential called 
“conservation of density-in-phase”, and integral called properly 
“conservation of extension-in-phase” [52]. Indeed: 
 Introducing “extension-in-phase”, he introduced implicitly 
phase space as the set of all extensions-in-phase. So he 
stressed that they are his elements, the counterparts of 
Boltzmann’s “atoms” or “molecules”. 
 Involving “density-in-phase”, he demonstrated the way for 
the systems or states to be “built” by the “extensions-in-
phase”, namely sharing them. The constant number of 
density-in-phase corresponds to the constant number of 
microstates per a macroscopic state in Boltzmann’s theory. 
 The principle as conservation of density-in-phase states that 
density-in-phase is constant in time (as to an ensemble of 
identical mechanical systems under the action of identical 
forces). This means that the probability for a system to share 
some volume in phase space is constant in time and thus 
corresponds to thermodynamic probability. 
 The conservation of extension-in-time means action 
conservation rather than energy conservation. Indeed energy 
conservation cannot describe the energy exchange between 
extensions-in-phase and the system as a whole for the huge 
difference in their energies. On the contrary, the conservation 
of quantity of action (“phase”) makes sense for the tiny energy 
of an extension-in-phase can be compensated by the 
commeasurably tiny quantity of density-in-phase, which 
reduces proportionally the effective time as to the system. 
Furthermore, action conservation can describe non-
equilibrium states and processes unlike energy conservation 
implying equilibrium.  
However Mehra states that “one might say that Gibbs 
succeeded very well in founding equilibrium thermodynamics on 
a statistical basis. But due to the great difficulties that existed at 
Boltzmann was who associated it with the atomistic hypothesis borrowed 
from chemistry and thus “materialized” it.     
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that time, and still do, he could not in the same way describe the 
gradual changes of the macroscopic properties in their approach 
to equilibrium.” [50] This is only another way for one to say that 
Gibbs’s theory describes both equilibrium and non-equilibrium 
states for the tool of phase space does not distinguish absolutely 
the two kinds of states to each other especially being quantized, 
i.e. “checked”. However, this is an advantage in a sense, for 
anyone knows nowadays that the atoms are quantum entities 
rather than tiny material “balls” as in Boltzmann.     
Only what one needs is to describe the time behavior of the 
thermodynamic systems in phase space: 
“GIBBS’ subtlety in achieving the maximum generality in his 
formulation must be stressed. He does not assume that 
thermodynamic systems are made up of molecules. He rather 
operates with abstract mechanical systems, and detects that 
thermodynamic systems obey the same laws as many particle 
mechanical systems, after a few reasonable approximations are 
made.” [53] 
Then Boltzmann’s theory can be deduced as the particular case 
under the following two conditions: 
 The systems are to be described after a long enough time after 
changes (interactions), i.e. in equilibrium. 
 The phase space is not to be quantized. 
 Both conditions in fact mean one and the same: entropy (i.e. 
the number of microstates per a macrostate) to be big enough 
but correspondingly in Clausevius’s and Boltzmann’s 
definition. 
Boltzmann’s theory is not able to describe fast processes and 
states of small entropies, which are the informational ones and 
which turn out to be those in quantum mechanics. It forces 
Boltzmann’s former “atoms” to be disjunctively separated in two 
big groups according to whether they obey the Pauli principle or 
not: either fermions or bosons. 
E.T. Jaynes [54] emphasizes the “quantum essence” of entropy 
in a rather extraordinary way: “Even at the purely 
phenomenological level, entropy is an anthropomorphic concept. 
For it is a property, not of the physical system, but of the particular 
experiments you or I choose to perform on it.” [52]10  
Entropy just as information or quantum information is 
measured in units of elementary choices. However, “choice” is not 
an anthropomorphic concept, as there is no other way for any 
unordered and even unorderable state in nature to be ordered then 
by some series of choices.  
Phase space can seem too parsimony. It allows to be deduced 
the First and Second Law but not the so-called Zeroth and Third 
Law of thermodynamics implying the absolute zero and 
prohibition of negative temperatures [55]. The collisions of atoms 
imply them in Boltzmann’s theory. However they are spared and 
removed together with the atoms themselves in Gibbs’s theory.     
In fact, this is a part of the maximal generalization in it: It is 
able to incorporate not only the statistical thermodynamics of 
“atoms” entirely separated to each other, but furthermore the 
                                                 
10 Also: “The difference is that energy is a property of the microstate, and 
so all observers, whatever macroscopic variables they may choose to 
define their thermodynamic states, must ascribe the same energy to a 
system in a given microstate. But they will ascribe different entropies to 
that microstate, because entropy is riot a property of the microstate, but 
rather of the reference class in which it is embedded.” [54] 
11 The entropy of the velocities of a thermodynamic ensemble is what 
corresponds exactly to the degree of relative separation between the 
subsystems of a thermodynamic system. The absolute zero of temperature 
mixed entangled states in quantum thermodynamics, in which the 
elements are only partly separated to each other. Then the negative 
values of temperature originate from negative entropies and 
probabilities due to the mutual restriction of the degrees of 
freedom of entangled systems.   
C. Tsallis introducing his fractal generalization of entropy 
noticed: “One of the most interesting is the fact that the 
inaccessible "temperatures" might belong to a finite interval that 
shrinks on the 𝑇𝑇 = 0 point in the 𝑞𝑞 → 1 limit” [56]. This means 
that the negative temperatures corresponds both to inseparable 
entangled states and over-separated fractal spaces (states). This is 
easily explainable for the inseparable entangled state in space of 
classical dimensionality n is equivalent to some over-separated 
fractal state in space of classical dimensionality 𝑛𝑛 + 𝑘𝑘 (𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘 =1, 2, 3 … . ). Or in other words, both Gibbs and Tsallis entropy are 
relevant both to fractal and to entangled states. 
However C. Tsalis stressed [59] a main property of Gibbs’s 
entropy, “extensivity or additivity” which his concept generalizes, 
in fact, just as the theory of entanglement needs. A few partly 
alternative comments are possible: 
 Tsallis’s entropy corresponds more exactly to Gibbs’s theory 
[57] than his own definition being a too literal generalization 
of Boltzmann’s entropy. 
 Any entangled system considered to the subsystems can be 
interpreted as non-entangled to the whole of the system: that 
is in the Tsallis parameter 𝑘𝑘 → 1 limit, which corresponds to 
the state of equilibrium [61], [62].    
 The state of equilibrium is relative to the scale of time: “the 
binary property of the system being or not being in 
equilibrium is replaced by a continuous property of 
commonness” [63]. 
 The interpretation of Gibbs’s theory as implicitly meaning 
non-equilibrium states is incorrect for the condition of 
equilibrium was expressly stressed by him [53].   
On the other hand, the sense of both negative and positive 
temperature as well is of the limit of absolute zero can be easily 
interpreted on that ground: The quantity of temperature11 
measures the degree of relative separation between the 
subsystems of a thermodynamic system. Thus the relative 
mechanical motion of atoms or molecules in Boltzmann’s theory 
should be understood as “anti-entanglement” just as entanglement 
in quantum information as “anti-motion”. The absolute zero 
distinguishes the states of entanglement from those of mechanical 
motion.   
The absolute zero is the boundary condition and borderline 
case, which Einstein [53] should discuss according to his declared 
intention, for the Newton mechanics applied to the “atoms” (the 
Boltzmann thermodynamics) to infer the Gibbs thermodynamics. 
Really, Einstein divided and emancipated to each other the two 
descriptions as the thermodynamics of the parts of a system 
(Boltzmann’s theory) and the absolutely independent 
thermodynamics of the system as a whole (Gibbs’s theory). Thus 
corresponds to both zero velocities and zero entropy of a single microstate 
per a macrostate, i.e. to the entropy of a single and absolutely inseparable 
whole. Then the whole is the exact sum of immovable parts. The negative 
temperature means the whole to be less than the sum of parts, and the 
positive ones, to be more, therefore including empty space. The zero 
entropy of the velocities means both infinite (maximal) information of the 
velocities (or any quantity) and infinite entropy of the momenta (or the 
corresponding conjugate).  
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his thermodynamics anticipated his later ideas and especially EPR 
as well as a future theory uniting the thermodynamics of 
entanglement, fractal dimensions, and classical statistic and 
mechanical ensembles.  
In particular, this shows that Gibbs entropy is general enough.  
Its reasonable generalization seems to rather difficult12.   
Phase space is just as (or more exactly, so) observable as atoms 
were in the age of Boltzmann and Gibbs. However, it unlike them 
has never claimed to be anything more than a theoretical 
instrument rather than reality.  
There is a curious symmetry between the utilization of atoms 
and phase space correspondingly in Boltzmann’s and Gibbs’s 
theory: Both being unobservable allow of the system to be 
correspondingly described in terms of the parts or of the whole.      
Then if Gibbs’s theory is more general, the viewpoint of the 
whole turns out to be more general, too, and thus not perfectly 
symmetrical to that of the parts. They can be individualized barely 
after a long enough time, and before that they did not make sense 
or even not exist.  
Einstein was who managed to restore the symmetry of whole 
and part in statistic thermodynamics in fact emancipating the 
descriptions in terms of the whole and the parts to each other. 
Gibbs’s theory can be called reductionist not less than that of 
Boltzmann only its reductionism is opposed: the atoms (elements) 
are reduced to properties or relations of the system by meditation 
of phase space.  
Nowadays and post factum, Boltzmann’s atomist reductionism 
seems to be justifiable and even prophetic as the atoms are 
incorporated in physical reality. However in the age of 
Boltzmann, Gibbs’s elimination of the rather doubtful hypothesis 
about atoms was the more reasonable selection, moreover 
allowing of statistic thermodynamics to be formulated more 
generally.  
This demonstrates once again that the reconstructing often 
depends on facts future to the selection for the very criterion of 
success suggests future events to determine ostensibly causally 
past theories.  
One can summarize the active dimensions of reality in Gibbs’s 
theory in comparison to Carnot’s and Boltzmann’s theories: 
 It is macroscopic as Carnot’s and unlike Boltzmann’s. 
 It constructs a rather sophisticated mathematical model as 
Boltzmann’s and unlike Carnot’s theory. Its relation to reality 
is neither so natural one as that of Carnot, nor so emancipated 
as Boltzmann’s claiming to be that hidden reality, which 
grounds ours of empirical experience. Gibbs’s theory involves 
theoretical and mathematical models only as tools for 
macroscopic thermodynamic reality to be investigated.  
 Gibbs’s theory is holistic being skeptic to the existence of 
atoms without being anti-atomistic.  
 Thus it turns out to be non-relational and reductionist just as 
Boltzmann’s is, eliminating however the elements, the 
“atoms” rather than the system as a whole.  Both differs from 
Carnot’s naïve harmonization of whole and parts in a cycle.   
    
                                                 
12 A previous attempt [57], [58] seems to be even more unsuccessful.   
6 EINSTEIN’S THEORY AND ITS CHANGE IN 
THE IMPLICIT CONCEPT OF REALITY 
The quite young and yet absolutely unknown Einstein wrote a few 
articles (1902-1904), the intention of which was statistical 
thermodynamics to be inferred absolutely rigorously from the 
laws of classical mechanics applied to big ensembles of atoms or 
molecules as well as to be suggested experiments, which might 
confirm or refuge their existence. “Einstein proceeded to derive 
the theorems of thermal equilibrium and the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics by the sole use of the mechanical equations and 
the theory of probability.” [50] 
His implicit concept of reality should be closer to that of 
Boltzmann rather than to that of Gibbs. Nevertheless he 
researched the construction of experiments for the atoms, which 
the pure theorist and philosopher Boltzmann did never. Unlike 
Boltzmann he did not attempt to reduce phenomenological 
thermodynamics to the mechanical movements of atoms and 
molecules, but did investigate the conditions, under which 
thermodynamics might be reduced to mechanics of atoms. 
Thus, his implicit concept of reality is inherently and internally 
differential. It addressed the difference in the interpretation of 
reality in those two great theories of physics.  
In fact this seems to be one of the secrets of his future successes 
and even … seeming failures. Indeed: 
 Special relativity is situated between mechanics and the 
theory of electromagnetism. The implicit concept of reality in 
both is different. The action of mechanical forces is 
instantaneous at any distance, however limited to the constant 
light velocity in electromagnetism according to Michelson 
and Morley’s experiments. Nevertheless he did not reduce 
mechanics to electromagnetism, but investigated the 
conditions, under which both could be consistent to each 
other.   
 General relativity is between special relativity and the theory 
of gravitation. The absolute and absolutely independent space 
and time, in which Newton’s theory of gravity acts, contradict 
to the relative and unified space-time of special relativity. 
However, he did not attempt to reduce gravity to special 
relativity, but to harmonize both to each other.    
 His resistance to quantum mechanics can be located between 
it and his own theory of relativity both general and special. 
EPR demonstrated that quantum mechanics rests on a 
“spooky” action at a distance unlike both his theories of 
relativity. Thus in fact, the phenomena of entanglement were 
forecast though rejected in favour of the hypothesis of the 
alleged incompleteness of quantum mechanics. EPR rests a 
kind of atoms, the “elements of reality”. However their reality 
was rejected in favour of the reality of quanta, in fact the cells 
of the “checked” phase space. Gibbs’s theory reality wins 
against Boltzmann’s.  
 His late research ran the space between electromagnetism and 
general relativity. It remained the empty the free option of a 
future non-quantum unified theory of gravity and 
electromagnetism. 
The implicit methodology of Einstein demonstrates 
convincingly that the collision of realities of different physical 
theories is exceptionally fruitful. They suggest different 
viewpoints and answers what the world is but though interpretable 
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in a certain generalized and common theoretical “reference 
frame”.  
Differential realism investigates those a few especially 
important dimensions of reality, in which the “battle of realities” 
happens … 
So, Einstein’s thermodynamics can be considered as the 
chronologically first application of his fundamental approach, 
which made him one of the greatest physicists of all time.  
The essence of that “binocular” kind of models as to Einstein’s 
thermodynamic can be explicit formulated by the assistance of 
two his later papers [64] and [65] commented in [60] about the 
quantity of thermodynamic probability (W) and Boltzmann’s 
principle, i.e. the proportionality of entropy (S) and log W:    
W implies some uncertainty, lack of knowledge about the 
macrostate (the one “ocular”) in terms of the microstates (the 
other “ocular”), and thus “binocularly” reproduces the cognitive 
space of possible solutions, after which that space can be merely 
observed and the “events” in it described in “Gedanken-
experiments”.  
One can say that quantum mechanics turns out to be a 
thermodynamic theory seen “binocularly” in that space. This 
originates from its fundamental principles formulated yet by 
Bohr: Unlike classical mechanics, it is a “binocular” or “dualistic” 
theory about both quantum entities and “apparatus” and thus about 
both microstates and macrostate implying a fundamental 
counterpart of W. This way for quantum mechanics to be seen can 
be called “thermodynamic mechanics” and opposed to Einstein’s 
intention for some “mechanic thermodynamics” both however 
“dwelling” that space visible by Einstein’s “pair of glasses”.       
Following Einstein’s tradition of “Gedankenexperiments”, let 
us begin shrink the “apparatus” more and more observing that 
space and its two “habitants”: the “incomplete”, but real quantum 
mechanics (“thermodynamic mechanics”) and the alleged 
complete quantum mechanics (“mechanic thermodynamics”). 
The shrink of the apparatus causes some diminution of all 
microstates, and the microstates remain constant. This results into 
increasing W and decreasing S.  
When the size of the macrostates becomes commeasurable 
with that of the microstates, W begins to converge to 1 and S to 0. 
This happens when the size of the apparatus has become 
commeasurable with that of the measured quantum entities. 
When their sizes become equal to each other, W is just 1, and 
S is 0, and both habitants of that “binocular” space merge 
themselves into a single entity, which can be identified as classical 
mechanics. This merging is forced for the space is already so 
shrunk that there is room only for one habitant. The “totalitarian” 
principle is realized: “One microstate, one macrostate, one theory, 
probability one, but zero freedom (entropy)”. Indeed classical 
mechanics is deterministic. 
Some would stop here. Not we! The apparatus continues to 
shrink and its size is already less than that of the measured entities. 
The microstate is correspondingly bigger than that of the 
macrostate, and W > 1: an extraordinary kind of probability, and 
S changes sign from plus to minus transforming iteslf into 
negative.  
The case of probability bigger than 1 can be equivalently 
represented as that of negative probability if one considers the 
                                                 
13 C. Tsallis also introduce his entropy as an (alternative) “measure of 
ignorance” discussing the non-universality of the Boltzmann – Gibbs (– 
Shannon) entropy [67].  
system of two independent events, the probability of the one of 
which is negative  [68].  
The negative probability implies the complex values of 
entropy: The room of the macrostate is already so tiny that a part 
of the microstate is already forced to go out in the space of the 
macrostate. Its probability is negative and its entropy is complex 
adding some purely imaginary entropy for the parts of the 
microstate remained outside of the macrostate. This is the world 
of quantum information and entanglement.   
Let us exchange the inscriptions “MACROSTATE” and 
“MICROSTATE” to each other: Suddenly, we turn out to be in 
the starting point of the “Gedankenexpereiment”, i.e. in our world. 
This is the quantum world if one exchanges the inscriptions 
“MACROSTATE” and “MICROSTATE”. However one cannot 
even exchange them, but may look to the sky at night and to see 
the “microstates” as big as stars and nebulas …       
On the ground of that “Geadankenexperiment” one can reflect 
both Einstein’s criticism to Boltzmann’s principle and the essence 
of thermodynamic probability newly. The quantity of our 
“ignorance”13, W*= 𝟏𝟏 −𝑾𝑾, about any physical quantity of any 
microstate makes physical sense in quantum mechanics as the 
thermodynamic probability W* of the conjugate of the physical 
quantity at issue. The necessary condition is: 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝟏𝟏 −𝑾𝑾) ≅
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝟏𝟏 − 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑾𝑾 = −𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑾𝑾, which is true only if 𝑾𝑾 ≅ 𝟎𝟎, i.e. the 
“size” of the microstate is much, much less than that of the 
microstate: right the case in quantum mechanics. However, the 
above thought experiment demonstrates that quantum mechanics 
should be approximately valid and thus substitutable by a future 
(more) complete theory just as Einstein suggested if Boltzmann 
principle holds and the Boltzmann – Gibbs definition of entropy 
is relevant.  
In fact the theorem about the absence of hidden variables [68], 
[69] demonstrate that quantum mechanics is complete and thus 
Boltzmann’s principle and entropy should be only approximately 
valid right just to that limit of much, much bigger macrostates. 
Tsallis’s entropy is one of the most relevant applicants to replace 
it [50]. Its parameter k can be always so adjusted to be satisfied 
the condition 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑾𝑾*≅ 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑾𝑾 and even 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑾𝑾*= 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑾𝑾.  
Even more, under the conditions of the above thought 
experiments, an exact value of k corresponds to any size of the 
apparatus being shrunk: this value k can be inferred from a 
generalized Boltzmann principle where entropy S is substituted 
by Tsallis’s entropy TS for the size of the shrunk apparatus (i.e. 
the “size” of a macrostate) is proportional to it under the condition 
of a standard and thus constant microstate. 
The theorems about the absence of hidden variables in 
quantum mechanics [68], [67] can be interpreted as the absolute 
exact coincidence of its model and reality or as the inversion of 
the relation between the model and reality in comparison to 
classical physics. Here is how:  
The model in quantum mechanics equates the degree of our 
ignorance about any physical quantity (i.e. the mismatch of the 
model to reality) to its conjugate, i.e. to another physical quantity 
and therefore to an “element of reality” thus transforming EPR’s 
meaning of the term. After the difference between the model and 
reality is included in both model and reality, this implies formally 
their necessarily coincidence. The above adjustment of k 
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according to the generalized Boltzmann principle follows that 
“ridiculous principle”. Furthermore, the latter corresponds rather 
directly to the axiom of choice in mathematics.   
Then one can postulate that “ridiculous principle”: there is a 
special theory, right quantum mechanics, which is always and 
forever true, i.e. in any reality.  
Nevertheless, Einstein’s general relativity seems to be an 
apparent exclusion of the “ridiculous principle” at least until now 
if the curvature in a point in pseudo-Riemannian space does not 
corresponds somehow to the Tsallis parameter. And vice versa: if 
the ridiculous principle holds even to it, that correspondence 
seems to be necessary, linking entanglement and gravitation.  
The common opinion is that Einstein’s first attempt (1902-
1904) is far not as successful as those in the next 1905 year. 
“Einstein’s thermodynamical papers did not attract much 
attention.” [50] One of the eventual causes might be that the 
unification of mechanics and thermodynamics implies at least 
some part of quantum mechanics:  
Indeed the problem of black body radiation situated between 
electromagnetism and thermodynamics implied the fundamental 
Planck constant and thus concept of quantum leap. Furthermore, 
phase space checked by the Planck constant forces some non-zero 
difference between Boltzmann’s and Gibbs’s entropy. Einstein’s 
approach implied also that kind of difference, but this might be 
only an accidental coincidence. Gibbs’s theory could be 
interpreted as thermodynamics of system as a whole, and that of 
Boltzmann as thermodynamics of its parts. Then quantum 
mechanics seen as mechanics of the whole and parts might be the 
relevant bridge of unification. 
Our problem to Einstein’s thermodynamics does not include 
any estimation of its truth. Differential realism excludes that task 
in principle for it is tool to investigate only relation between two 
or more theories and their implicit concepts of reality rather than 
some alleged absolute relation of any theory to reality “by itself”. 
This seems to be a metaphysical problem in a bad sense. 
 First of all, it is inherently and internally relative14 just as all 
Einstein’s theories or ideas whether successful or 
unsuccessful. His implicit general methodology implies that 
relativity as this is demonstrated above and which 
distinguishes it from Carnot’s, Boltzmann’s, and Gibbs’s 
theories. Carnot’s does not suggests any problem about the 
whole and parts for they are naturally unified by the object of 
research, the steam-engine cycle. Boltzmann’s and Gibbs’s 
are more and less reductionist and thus non-relative. 
 This main property implies further for the concept of reality 
to be both macroscopic and microscopic as well as consisting 
both of a whole and of its parts. It generates a double or 
relative theoretical reality and model and thus outlines the 
possible space of unification. The double model is constructed 
intentionally to conserve the mismatch between the realities 
of the theories. Its main objectivity is to recreate the space of 
possible solution.  
 Carnot’s, Boltzmann’s, and Gibbs’s models are constructed 
directly as solutions of their problem. Thus they more 
(Gibbs’s and especially Boltzmann’s) or less (Carnot’s) 
dominate and ground reality. The double model of Einstein 
                                                 
14 One can use the terms of relational and relationality for Einstein’s of 
relative or relativity as referring to the meta-theory unlike Einstein’s 
referring to the theory itself; but may not.  
being intentionally partly inconsistent is not able to do this, 
and in fact this does not make much sense: Einstein himself 
called the type of his models “Gedankenexperiments”.  They 
are able to constitute self-developing or self-organizing 
theoretical reality, which Einstein as if only observed waiting 
for the solution of the problem from its standalone work by 
itself.  
 The same implies that the implicit concept of reality in his 
thermodynamics is both theoretical and observable.      
   
    7 CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
The fundamental philosophical concept or category of reality 
turns out to be rather a fussy class sharing only “family 
resemblances” in the sense of Wittgenstein than the intersection 
of any common essence, which would allow for a general 
definition of “reality”.  
One can consider all the approaches of “selective realism’ as 
“a box of tools” utilizable for investigating the implicit concept of 
reality in concrete scientific theories. 
A few thermodynamic theories share a common implicit 
concept of reality as the empirically and experimentally accessible 
wholeness of the thermodynamic system distinguishing from each 
other by the different understand of its elements and thus, by the 
interpretation about their relation to the whole. 
On the other hand the relation of “parts and whole” is a 
fundamental philosophical problem, which in the frames of the 
thermodynamic theories is supplied by an absolutely exact 
mathematical model as the corresponding conjecture underlying 
the theory rather than an only qualitative solution or preference as 
it is usual for philosophical doctrines. 
The quantity of entropy, close to that of information, unifies 
the approaches of how one can describe mathematically bath parts 
and whole in the same terms and physical quantities for the 
thermodynamic description. 
Thus, a fundamental philosophical and mathematical 
difference between the concept of reality in mechanics and 
thermodynamics can be outlined: 
The mechanical elements of the whole are well-ordered in time 
as a certain trajectory. The thermodynamic elements, on the 
contrary, do no need a certain trajectory and admit a more general 
description invariant to the change between well-orderings of the 
same ensemble15.  
The approach can serve as a heuristic tool to the implicit 
concept of reality in quantum mechanics after one has considered 
the coherent state before measurement “thermodynamically” (i.e. 
as an ensemble of all possible well-orderings (or “worlds”) and 
the measured state “mechanically (i.e. bringing into the result a 
certain well-ordering due to the measuring itself rather than to 
quantum reality). 
Furthermore, the transition from the “thermodynamic 
viewpoint before measurement” and the “mechanic viewpoint 
after measurement” can be interpreted as the exchange between 
two classes of frames or even, of reference frames “out of the 
(thermodynamic) system” and “within it” therefore hinting a 
possible generalization of the principle of relativity as an approach 
to the problem of quantum gravity.   
15 Just as a cardinal or ordinal number is invariant to the different well-
orderings of the same set. 
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